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1 Introduction 
Immigrant students typically perform substantially worse than native students in the 
OECD countries. According to PISA, the performance gap between first generation 
immigrants and natives amounts to around half a standard deviation in math, reading, 
and science (OECD 2006). In this paper we examine to what extent this is due to the 
characteristics of the neighborhoods in which the immigrants grow up. Since recently 
arrived immigrants tend to settle in close proximity to people sharing their ethnic 
background (Stark 1991), we pay particular attention to the characteristics of the ethnic 
community. 
There is a large literature on the impact of residential and school segregation on the 
outcomes of disadvantaged groups in general. But there is not so much dealing with 
immigrant children in particular. This is perhaps surprising given that the characteristics 
of the neighborhood community can exert particularly strong influences on young 
migrants striving to find their place in the new country. Moreover, the work by 
Heckman and coauthors (e.g., Cunha and Heckman 2007) suggests that the impact of 
the environment is more pronounced in disadvantaged families.  
The question we examine also sheds light on the rationale for policies designed to 
shift the location of immigrants. These policies may come in the form of incentive 
programs, such as Moving to Opportunity (see Kling et al. 2007), or deliberate attempts 
by the governments to restrict the location choices of new immigrants; the latter kind of 
policies are (or have been) practiced by many European countries (see Edin et al. 2004).  
It is an open question whether the characteristics of the ethnic community has a 
causal effect on immigrant student achievement. Ethnic concentration per se may be 
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beneficial if the enclave provides useful information on, e.g., the workings of the 
education system, but detrimental if residential concentration hampers proficiency in the 
host country’s language. But the characteristics of the contacts are arguably at least as 
important. Well-established and educated peers may act as role models, but living 
among people with poor socioeconomic status and performance may have a negative 
influence on youth (cf. Cutler and Glaeser 1997). 
Our paper is related to several branches of literature. First, there is a large literature 
on the impact of residential segregation on adult minorities (including immigrants) in 
general.1 The evidence is somewhat mixed. Segregation per se may hurt individuals 
(e.g. Cutler and Glaeser 1997) but the literature also points to the importance of the 
quality of neighborhood contacts (Bertrand et al. 2000; Åslund and Fredriksson 2008).  
Second, there is a growing body of (largely U.S.) research studying the effects of 
racial composition within schools or neighborhoods on student performance.2 In 
general, these studies suggest that the performance of black students is reduced by 
attending schools with a large fraction of black students.  
Third, there is a small literature examining whether ethnic concentration affects the 
school performance of immigrants. Cortes (2006) studied the effect of age at arrival and 
attending an enclave school on the test scores of a sample of first and second generation 
immigrants residing in the cities of Miami and San Diego in the U.S. She found that 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Åslund and Fredriksson (2008), Bertrand et al. (2000), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Edin et al. (2003), and 
Goel and Lang (2009) for recent contributions. 
2 See e.g., Angrist and Lang (2004), Boozer et al. (1992), Card and Rothstein (2007), Grogger (1996), Guryan (2004), 
Hanushek et al. (2002), Hoxby (2000), and Rivkin (2000). 
3
attending an enclave school (defined as one where above 25 percent are foreign-born) 
has no effect on students' test scores. 3 
Fourth, there are some studies which examine whether immigrants’ labor market 
success is related to the characteristics of the childhood neighborhood.4 For instance, 
Borjas (1995) found that (second generation) immigrants who grew up in ethnic com-
munities with an abundance of human capital did better on the labor market.  
The studies by Cortes (2006) and Borjas (1995) are directly relevant to our paper. 
However, as for many other studies of contextual effects, one could worry that selection 
problems bias the estimates in these two studies. This is mainly because a student’s 
neighborhood or school is a family choice variable. If residential choice is based on 
unobserved characteristics which also affect learning outcomes, the estimates will be 
biased and cannot be interpreted causally.  
We rely on a governmental placement policy to generate exogenous variation in the 
initial residential distribution. Between 1987–1991 Swedish authorities assigned 
refugees to their initial location. Since individuals were not free to choose, we argue that 
the initial location was independent of (unobserved) individual characteristics, an issue 
we will obviously return to below.5 
Our strategy is demanding on data availability. We have access to administrative 
records containing detailed information on all students graduating from Swedish 
                                                 
3 See Bygren and Szulkin (2007) for a related study using Swedish data. Jensen and Rasmussen (2008) have 
examined whether student outcomes are related to immigrant concentration using Danish data. Their estimates 
suggest a negative impact of immigrant concentration on student performance. Neither of these studies in practice 
handles the problems caused by residential self-selection. 
4 The paper by Grönqvist (2006) also belongs to this category. 
5 We have previously used this approach to study economic outcomes among adult migrants; see Edin et al. (2003) 
Åslund and Fredriksson (2008) Åslund et al. (2006) and Åslund and Rooth (2007). Gould et al. (2004) use a similar 
placement policy where Ethiopian refugees were distributed across Israeli municipalities to identify the causal effect 
of school quality on students' high school grades. There are also papers exploiting similar policies in Denmark; see 
e.g. Damm (2009a, 2009b). 
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compulsory schools during 1988–2003. The data also contain rich individual 
information on the population aged 16–65 from 1985 and onwards, and provide the 
opportunity to link children to their parents. This means that we can identify when the 
individual arrived, where he or she initially resided, the characteristics of his or her 
parents, and the properties of the neighborhood peers at different points in time. 
The results suggest that a standard deviation increase in the fraction of highly 
educated peers in the assigned neighborhood raises compulsory school GPA by 0.9 
percentile ranks; a corresponding increase in the size of the ethnic community in the 
assigned neighborhood has about the same effect, but the effect is less precisely 
estimated. The effects of the characteristics of the ethnic community are larger among 
those who arrived before age seven than for those who arrive at an older age.  
Had we not accounted for residential self-selection using the placement policy, our 
conclusions regarding the impact of ethnic concentration would have been very 
different. Auxiliary regressions suggest that disadvantaged children (in the unobserved 
sense) are sorted into neighborhoods with a high share of members from their own 
ethnic group. The sorting bias is so severe that the size of the ethnic community at the 
time of graduation is negatively related to student outcomes. Sorting bias does not 
plague the estimate on the educational composition of the ethnic group, however. 
The analysis also shows that the effects of the educational composition of peers do 
not vary by gender or parental education. However, the size of the ethnic community is 
more important for boys and for children whose parents are less-educated, two groups 
that have the poorest school outcomes. These results shed light on the sorting bias 
alluded to above. Having a less-educated family background, for example, is arguably 
5
negatively correlated with the unobserved determinants of school outcomes. The results 
on heterogeneous effects thus suggest that it is rational for students from weak 
backgrounds to sort themselves into ethnic communities, which, again, is the sorting 
pattern we observe in our data. 
The above results are obtained using neighborhood fixed effects, and thereby 
implicitly holding the overall population of immigrants constant. In auxiliary 
regressions, imposing more restrictive assumptions, we also report evidence on how 
school performance is affected by the size of the total immigrant community. These 
tentative results suggest that immigrant concentration is detrimental for school 
performance, but that the positive effects of ethnic concentration prevail. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
background information on the educational system, how immigrant students perform in 
Swedish schools, and the placement policy which we base our analysis on. In Section 3, 
we present the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy in more detail and contains 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Immigration and residential concentration in Sweden 
 
Sweden has a large immigrant population: 12 percent (out of a population of 9 million) 
are foreign-born. Even though Sweden has received net migration since the 1930s, the 
larger inflows began in the 1950s and 1960s as workers were recruited primarily from 
Finland, but also from Central and Southern Europe and Turkey. Starting in the 1970s, 
labor migrants were gradually replaced by refugees and family reunification migrants, a 
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development which accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. The large refugee inflows have 
changed the source country composition of the immigrant population dramatically. 
Parallel to the demographic changes there has been a decline in the economic 
performance of migrants. Today, Sweden stands out as one of the countries with the 
largest immigrant-native differentials in the labor market (OECD 2007). 
As in other Western countries, the immigrant population is concentrated to certain 
regions and neighborhoods. Greater Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö host about one 
third of the overall population but as much as half of the foreign-born. Within larger 
regions, immigrants tend to be concentrated to particular areas, usually situated in the 
suburbs (Åslund et al. 2006). The residential concentration is also reflected in the 
immigrant share of the neighborhoods populated by the foreign-born.6 The typical 
immigrant lives in an area where a quarter of the working-age population is foreign-
born, which can be compared to the national average of 12 percent. 
Previous studies show that the typical immigrant-dense neighborhood contains a mix 
of ethnic groups. Such areas are primary united by a shortage of natives (Andersson 
2000). Still, different groups are relatively concentrated in different areas; e.g. Iranians 
constitute a substantially larger share of the foreign-born in Göteborg than in Sweden’s 
other major cities. Also at the finest geographic level this segregation is evident; people 
have substantially more country-of-origin peers living in their neighborhood than what 
can be explained by regional sorting or by a division of immigrants and natives in 
general. We will return to this issue in the description of our sample of child migrants. 
                                                 
6 As described in the data section we use SAMS (Small Area Market Statistics) areas to define neighborhoods. 
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2.2 Immigrants in Swedish compulsory education 
 
Compulsory education is 9 years in Sweden and starts at age 7; the typical age at 
graduation is thus 16.7 There is a national curriculum that all compulsory schools 
follow. After compulsory school a vast majority go on to upper-secondary education 
where admission is based on compulsory school grades. 
We study cohorts graduating the nine-year compulsory school between 1988 and 
2003. Within this time-frame, the grading system was reformed. Up until 1998, grades 
given at graduation were on a scale from 1 to 5 and relative in the sense that the national 
average for each graduating cohort was to be 3.0.  We use the GPA (i.e. the mean of the 
individual’s grades), rounded to one decimal. Given that there are no observations with 
GPA below 1, there are 40 steps in the GPA for these years. From 1998, grades are on 
an “absolute” scale, which is to be based on performance only and not related to the 
achievement of others. Each subject gives one of the following points: 0 (fail), 10 
(pass), 15 (pass with distinction), or 20 (pass with special distinction), and the GPA is 
defined as the sum of the best 16 grades. The maximum score is thus 320, the minimum 
is 0, and the distribution contains 80 observed steps. Given the differences in the 
grading system over time, and the fact that there is evidence of grade inflation in the 
new system (e.g., Cliffordson, 2004), we use the by-cohort percentile ranking of the 
individual grade and include cohort dummies in all estimations. 
Of special interest for our study are the rules for allocating students to schools. Up 
until 1991, the Swedish compulsory school system assigned students to the school 
situated nearest to their residential area. This residence principle is still the leading rule 
                                                 
7 See Björklund et al. (2005) for further details on the Swedish education system. 
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on how to allocate students to schools. However, in 1992, the central government 
introduced a school choice reform, where parents in principle are free to choose their 
children's school within the municipality. It is important to note, however, that parental 
preferences are severely constrained by space limitations, and priority is always given to 
kids residing close to the school. Thus, the assignment of refugee children to 
neighborhoods to a very large degree determined which schools they attended. Also, 
since there are far more neighborhoods than schools, controlling for area of residence 
effectively also means controlling for schools. 
There is ample evidence that immigrant children perform poorly in the Swedish 
school system.8 According to PISA 2003, the gap between the Swedish-born and the 
foreign-born at age 15 amounts 0.7–0.8 standard deviations of the PISA score 
distribution in math, reading and science (OECD 2006). The gap between the native-
born and immigrants is about twice as large as the gender difference in reading. Within 
the immigrant group, there are big differences depending on time spent in Sweden: 
those who arrive after age 7 perform substantially worse than those who migrate before 
age 7 (Böhlmark 2008).   
2.3 The refugee placement policy9 
 
In 1985, the Swedish Immigration Board was given the task of assigning newly arrived 
refugee immigrants to an initial municipality of residence. The policy was introduced in 
response to complaints from cities that had experienced a rise in immigration and 
perceived this as a burden on local public budgets. By placing asylum seekers in 
                                                 
8 See Lundh et al. (2002) and Björklund et al. (2005), for instance. 
9 Edin et al. (2003) contains a more detailed description of the placement policy. As is common in the European 
context, we do not distinguish refugees from asylees. 
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municipalities that had suitable characteristics for reception the government hoped to 
speed up the integration process.  
Because of the large inflow of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, the number of 
receiving municipalities was increased from 60 to include 277 of Sweden's 284 
municipalities in 1989. Available public housing essentially determined the placement. 
The policy was formally running 1985–1994, but the implementation was strictest 
between 1987 and 1991. During this period, the placement rate was around 90 percent, 
and the individuals involved were given very little room to choose the initial 
municipality of residence. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the 1987–91 period. 
Asylum seekers were placed in refugee centers pending a decision from the 
immigration authorities. The centers were located all over Sweden, and center 
assignment was independent of port of entry to Sweden. The mean duration between 
entry into Sweden and the receipt of a permit varied between three and twelve months 
during 1987–1991. After receiving the permit, municipal placement occurred within a 
much shorter period of time, partly because there were explicit goals for reducing the 
time span between receipt of the residence permit and placement. Refugee preferences 
were considered in the municipal assignment, but individuals applied for residence in 
the largest cities where there were few vacancies because of the economic boom. 
Assigning a refugee to a municipality was conditional on having found a vacant 
apartment within that particular municipality. (Since individuals were assigned to an 
apartment, they were in practice assigned to a neighborhood.) After having been 
assigned to an apartment, refugees were basically free to move. The only "cost" of 
moving, apart from direct moving costs, was delayed enrolment in language courses. 
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2.3.1 Placement as a policy experiment 
 
The a priori arguments for considering placement as exogenous with respect to the 
unobserved characteristics of the individual are the following: (i) the individual could 
not choose his or her first place of residence due the institutional setup, the practical 
limitations imposed by scarce housing, and the short time frame between the receipt of 
residence permit and placement; (ii) there was no direct interaction between local 
placement officers and individual refugees, meaning that any selection must have been 
on observed characteristics. 
With respect to the first point, note that the timing of the receipt of the residence 
permit must coincide with the arrival of a housing vacancy in the preferred location, if 
the refugee was to realize his or her most preferred option. The joint probability of these 
two events happening at the same time must be considered extremely low.10  
Previous work substantiates the argument that the placement policy did create a 
geographic distribution which was independent of unobserved individual characteristics. 
Edin et al. (2003) showed that the overall geographic distribution of those subjected to 
the placement policy differed from the location choices made by migrants arriving from 
the same regions shortly before the reform. Åslund et al. (2006) showed that the initial 
characteristics of the assigned locations differed pre and post reform; but after 9–10 
years in Sweden the sorting pattern of those who arrived under the placement policy 
came to resemble that of other migrants. We take this as evidence that people were not 
able to realize their preferred option. 
                                                 
10 Oreopoulos (2003) uses a similar argument to motivate why assignment to a public housing project can be 
considered exogenous for new recipients of welfare payments in Toronto.  
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A strict test of our assumption that placement is exogenous conditional on the 
observables is hard to come by since it requires a characteristic which was not exploited 
by placement officers but correlated with the unobserved ability of the individual. 
Nevertheless, we have examined whether the share of highly educated in the ethnic 
community (“ethnic human capital”) in the assigned location is correlated with month 
of birth, which in turn is related to various outcomes (Bound et al. 2000). Figure 1 
presents the regression coefficients on dummies for month of birth, along with a 95 
percent confidence interval, holding constant the other individual characteristics which 
potentially influenced placement. There is no systematic relationship between ethnic 
human capital and month of birth. One of the individual coefficients is close to being 
significant. But this is not surprising: even if ethnic human capital and birth month are 
randomly associated we would expect 1 of the 11 coefficients to be significant at the 9 
percent level. 
Given the institutional setting, and the information documented here, we think it is 
valid to assume that the assignment location is exogenous to the child, conditional on 
his or her observed characteristics. Note that this assumption is less strict than in, e.g., 
Edin et al. (2003), since child and parental characteristics are not perfectly correlated.11 
 
 
                                                 
11 Estimates of the intergenerational earnings correlation are typically much lower in Sweden than in the U.S. Corak 
(2006) reports “preferred” estimates for different countries: the estimate for Sweden is 0.27 compared to 0.47 for the 
U.S.   
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Figure 1 Ethnic human capital in assigned location by month of birth 
Notes: The figure shows estimates (solid line, 95 percent confidence interval given by dashed lines) from 
a linear regression of the share of highly educated in the ethnic community in the assigned location on a 
set of dummies for month of birth. The model also controls for gender, age at immigration, age of the 
mother,  the educational attainment of the mother as well as the father, family size, country of birth fixed 
effects, neighborhood fixed effects, immigration year fixed effects, and graduation year fixed effects.  
 
3 Data 
We use administrative data covering the entire Swedish population aged 16–65 for each 
year during 1985–2004. The data originate from administrative registers maintained by 
Statistics Sweden and contain information on, e.g., labor market status, educational 
attainment, income, taxes, and various demographic variables.12 An important feature of 
the data is that we can link students to their parents and we are thereby able to include 
                                                 
12 The key registers are the income tax registers (Inkomst- och taxeringsstatistiken), population registers (Registret för 
totalbefolkningen), the register on educational attainment (Utbildningsregistret), the grade-9 register (Årskurs-9 
registret), and the multi-generational register (Flergenerationsregistret). 
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information on several parental characteristics. We define parental characteristics 
separately for each parent. 
Our main sample consists of the children of refugees whose parents obtained their 
residence permit between the years 1987 to 1991. These children may have graduated 
from compulsory school between 1988 and 2003. From 1988 and onwards there is 
information on all final grades for students graduating from Swedish compulsory 
school. The individuals were between 0 and 16 years of age at migration. We identify 
refugee immigrants by region of origin and exclude children who did not arrive together 
with the parent who first came to Sweden. The motivation for excluding these 
individuals is that they are likely to have immigrated because of family reunification 
reasons, and these immigrants were exempted from the placement policy. 
In this paper we use SAMS (Small Area Market Statistics) areas to capture 
neighborhoods. SAMS areas are defined as homogenous areas in certain respects; it 
may be a homogenous area with certain types of buildings—high-rise buildings, owner-
occupied housing, or business complexes, for instance. The SAMS are the smallest 
geographic unit available in Swedish data. Sweden has about 9,000 SAMS areas, which 
gives an average of 1,000 residents (of which about 600 are of working age). However, 
the average individual lives in an area with 1,849 inhabitants aged 16–65. Since the 
foreign-born are concentrated to urban areas it is not surprising to find that the average 
immigrant lives in a somewhat more populated area; the average immigrant lived in a 
SAMS area with 2,498 inhabitants aged 16–65. 
Since individuals do not enter the data before age 16, we use the assignment location 
of the parent(s) who arrived together with the child to get information on the first 
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SAMS area. We also measure the characteristics of the location observed in the 
individual’s year of graduation. A potential problem is that we only observe the region 
of residence at the end of the year. If the observed initial location differs from the actual 
initial placement due to internal migration, this creates a measurement error in initial 
placement. This issue has been thoroughly investigated in Edin et al. (2003) where a 
weighting scheme based on aggregate data on municipal refugee reception from the 
Immigration Board was used. The estimates from the weighted regressions were very 
similar to the non-weighted ones, suggesting that this measurement error is not a big 
concern. 
Notice that, by and large, schools aggregate neighborhoods. There are close to 2,000 
schools and 9,000 SAMS areas. In principle, it would be interesting to examine whether 
it is the characteristics of the neighborhood or the school which matter for student 
achievement. But in practice it will be very hard to disentangle the two. Since the 
characteristics of the neighborhood will capture the neighborhood as well as the 
schools, we choose to measure the characteristics at the neighborhood level.13 
The outcome studied in this paper is the percentile rank (by graduation year) of the 
compulsory school GPA. Although not perfect, the GPA is the best widely available 
summary measure of compulsory school performance in Sweden. Furthermore, it is the 
basis for admission and selection to upper secondary school.  
 
 
                                                 
13 There is some scope for trying to disentangle the effects of school and neighborhood characteristics. Children in 
some neighborhoods go to different schools, and there is time variation in school catchment areas. But given that 
there are substantial difficulties in identifying catchment areas, we leave this endeavor for future research.  
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3.1 A description of the sample 
 
Table A1 and Table A2 provide some general descriptive statistics of the estimation 
sample, containing a total of 20,039 individuals. Not unexpectedly, outcomes are quite 
poor; the average percentile rank of the GPA is 40. The typical child migrant in the 
sample was 8 years of age when he/she arrived in Sweden. There are slightly more boys 
in the sample (53–47) and mean sibship size is close to 3, which is relatively high by 
Swedish standards. 
A fair share (16.5 percent) of the fathers is not present in the data. Among those 
observed, educational information is unavailable for about 11 (7.6) percent of the 
fathers (mothers). The observed distribution of education shows that about half the 
parents have only compulsory education. Thirty percent have some short or long high 
school, and approximately 20 percent have obtained education at the university level.  
It is also clear that there is variation in region of origin. Iranians are the largest 
group, making up about a quarter of the sample. 17.8 percent originate in Northern 
Africa, 13.3 percent in Chile. About 20 percent of the individuals have arrived from 
different parts of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
The descriptive statistics also show residential concentration among the studied 
refugees. There is substantial variation in the size of the SAMS population in the 
sample, but the average is higher than what is observed in the overall population, which 
is consistent with concentration to larger cities with higher population density. The 
immigrant share in the neighborhood (at the time of graduation) is as high as 31 percent, 
which is much higher than in the overall population (12 percent). Concentration in the 
“ethnic” dimension is even stronger: on (a weighted) average, the groups studied 
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constitute 0.6 percent of the working-age population, yet the average “ethnic” share in 
the neighborhood is 3.2 percent at the time of graduation. 
4 How do neighborhood characteristics affect 
immigrant student achievement? 
We begin this section by discussing specification issues and our empirical strategy.  We 
pursue two different specifications. One is designed to estimate the impact of the size of 
the immigrant community, the other to estimate the impact of the characteristics of the 
ethnic community, holding immigrant concentration constant. The latter specification 
constitutes our main empirical approach. We then turn to presenting the results. Section 
4.2 examines the impact of the size of the immigrant community in the assigned 
location. Section 4.3 presents the results pertaining to the characteristics of the ethnic 
community; the section contains the average effects as well as separate estimates by 
certain observed characteristics (gender, parental education, and age at arrival), and 
some robustness checks. 
4.1 Empirical strategy and specification issues 
 
To fix ideas, consider the following simple model (where we have suppressed arrival 
time fixed effects and graduation time fixed effects for convenience). 
 
 icscs
p
s
pm
s
me
cs
e
iics XXXxy ελλβββα ++++++= lnlnln  (1) 
 
where i indexes individuals, c countries of origin, and s neighborhoods (SAMS areas). y 
is the outcome of interest (the percentile ranked GPA), jX , pmej ,,= , denotes the 
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characteristics of the (e)thnic community, the (m)igrant community, and the 
(p)opulation in the neighborhood. ix  denotes a vector of individual characteristics (the 
subject’s age at immigration, the mother’s age, mother’s and father’s level of education, 
gender and family size). 
Notice that the effects of ecsX  are identified even if we treat sλ  as neighborhood fixed 
effects, since there is variation across ethnicities within a neighborhood. However, the 
effects of msX  and 
p
sX  are not, since there is no variation within a neighborhood. This 
obvious point demonstrates a trade-off in the analysis: investigation of some issues 
comes at the price of stronger assumptions for identification. 
Indeed, a lot of the (European) policy discussion focuses on the consequences of 
attending immigrant dense schools or growing up in immigrant dense neighborhoods. 
To tackle this wider policy question, we replace the neighborhood fixed effects with 
municipality fixed effects (there are 290 municipalities). The effects of msX , say, are 
then identified using the variation across neighborhoods within a municipality. The 
estimates from this specification will not suffer from bias due to individual self-
selection, given that the placement policy generates variation in neighborhood 
characteristics which are independent of unobserved individual characteristics. But there 
is a potential for bias due omitted variables at the neighborhood level, for instance, due 
to correlations between unobserved school quality and immigrant density.14  
The neighborhood fixed effects model imposes a weaker set of assumptions. 
Therefore we focus on this model and thus elaborate mostly on the importance of the 
characteristics of the ethnic community.  
                                                 
14 Notice, though, that the municipality fixed effects arguably absorb everything related to the labor market. 
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4.2 The impact of size of the immigrant community 
 
Table 1 reports the results of a barebones model, where we relate immigrant student 
achievement to the sizes of the ethnic and immigrant communities. In column (1) we 
present the results from the municipality fixed effects model, while column (2) contains 
the neighborhood fixed effects model. Throughout we enter the neighborhood 
characteristics in logs.15 
Table 1 A barebones model 
 
The interpretation of the estimates in column (1) relies on the assumption that we 
have not omitted relevant neighborhood variables. The fact that the coefficient on the 
size of the ethnic community only changes marginally when we move from column (1) 
to column (2) suggests that omitted variables are not a big concern. 
                                                 
15 The log specification is very convenient since it implies that the results are invariant to the precise segregation 
measure used; see Bertrand et al. (2000) on this point. Although convenient, the log specification comes with a small 
“price”. We encounter some problems when there are no fellow countrymen in the community. We deal with this 
issue by assigning an arbitrary low value for the size of the ethnic community and then include a dummy variable that 
indicates no other fellow countrymen. Note that the inclusion of the dummy variable implies that the procedure of 
assigning arbitrary values to empty cells will not affect the estimate on the neighborhood characteristics. Further, the 
estimate on the size of the community gives the effect of increasing the size of the community conditional on there 
being at least one person from one’s own ethnic group in the neighborhood. 
Dependent variable: Percentile ranked GPA  
 (1) (2) 
Characteristics measured at year of arrival  
Size of ethnic community 
 
 
.646**    
(.247) 
 
.514*    
(.290) 
Size of immigrant community –1.034**    
(.524) 
 
Population size .879    
(.554) 
 
(Initial) SAMS FE:s No Yes 
(Initial) Municipality FE:s Yes No 
Ethnic group FE:s Yes Yes 
Year of arrival FE:s Yes Yes 
Year of graduation FE:s Yes Yes 
Number of observations 20,039 20,039 
Notes: Neighborhood characteristics are measured in logs. The sample consists of refugee immigrants whose parents 
arrived during the period 1987−1991 and who completed compulsory school not later than 2003. All regressions 
control linearly for the subject’s and the mother’s age, with dummies for each parent’s educational attainment (five 
levels), family size, gender and missing values. Standard errors robust for clustering at the SAMS*ethnic group level 
(5947 cells) in parentheses. ** = significant at 5 % level; * = significant at 10 % level 
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The estimates in column (1) suggest a positive impact of a larger ethnic community. 
By contrast, there is a negative effect of expanding the immigrant community. Notice 
that the estimate on the size of the ethnic community captures the effect of replacing an 
immigrant of another ethnicity with an immigrant of the subject’s own ethnicity (since 
the overall size of the immigrant community is held constant). The estimate on the size 
of the immigrant community, on the other hand, should be interpreted as the effect of 
increasing the density of immigrants of another ethnicity (since the size of the ethnic 
community is held constant). 
How should the magnitudes be interpreted? Since the neighborhood variables are 
entered in logs, a unit change corresponds to increasing the size of the community by 
around 170 percent.16 Evaluated at this change, an increase in the size of the ethnic 
community in the assigned location has the effect of raising immigrant student 
achievement (at graduation) by 0.65 percentile ranks. An increase in the density of other 
immigrants would reduce immigrant performance by roughly a percentile rank. On the 
basis of the estimates, we can also examine what happens to student performance when 
the size of the ethnic group changes, taking into account that this will also change 
overall immigrant density. The effect of increasing the size of the ethnic community, 
holding only neighborhood population constant, equals 0.56 which is significant at the 
5-percent level (the standard error is 0.23). 
                                                 
16 This is just to say that (exp(1)–exp(0)) ≈ 1.7. Notice that the standard deviation of the log of the size of the ethnic 
group is 1.3, i.e., it exceeds unity.  
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4.3 The impact of the characteristics of the ethnic community 
 
Now, let us turn to the impact of the characteristics of the ethnic community. To analyze 
this issue we focus on the specification including neighborhood fixed effects, a 
specification which is robust to omitted variables at the neighborhood level.  
Column (2) of Table 1 reports the estimates of the “barebones” model, which only 
includes the size of the own community. As noted, the effect of increasing the size of 
the ethnic community in the assigned location is positive. But the result does not yield 
so much insight into why this is the case.  
To make some headway into this question we postulate what we think of as a pure 
peer effects model. Our incarnation of this model is that the student outcomes of 
immigrant children are influenced by the educational background of the children with 
whom the potentially interacts, in school as well as in the neighbourhood. In practice we 
assume that ecsX  = (the number of highly educated adults with kids under age 18 in the 
ethnic community).17 It is straightforward to decompose this quantity into three 
components: (i) the number of adult countrymen (aged 25–65) living in the 
neighborhood (denoted by N); (ii) the fraction of these countrymen who are high 
educated, i.e. have at least three years of upper-secondary education (which is denoted 
by h); and (iii) the fraction of the highly-educated countrymen in the neighborhood who 
have kids under age 18 (denoted by π ). We thus have ecs
e
cs hNX )( π××= . Introducing 
this expression into equation (1), and attaching a separate coefficient on the 
components, we get 
                                                 
17 We would have liked to have a closer matching between the age of the subject (the immigrant child) and the age 
range of his potential peers. Since the ethnic communities are so small this not feasible in practice.  
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  icscs
e
cs
ee
cs
ee
cs
e
iics hNxy ελλπβββα ++++++= lnlnln 321  (2) 
 
where we have suppressed msX  and 
p
sX  since they do not vary within neighborhood 
and are thus picked up by the fixed effects. We emphasize again that the neighborhood 
variables are measured at the time of immigration, since this is the only time when 
neighborhood characteristics are exogenous to the unobserved characteristics of the 
individual. Moreover, we exclude the parent(s) of the individual when calculating the 
neighborhood characteristics.  
The specification in (2) provides a convenient test of what characteristics of the 
ethnic community are important, and to some extent why. If eee 321 βββ == , the pure peer 
effects model applies and it is the number of highly educated parents that have an 
impact on student performance. The configuration eee 213  ,0 βββ ==  may suggest that the 
neighborhood is important because all adults act as role models. In this case, it is the 
number of highly educated in the entire ethnic community that matters; there is no 
additional effect coming from the human capital of the parents. In general, e2β  measures 
the impact of increasing the human capital of the community while holding size 
constant, while e1β  gives the effect of increasing the size of the community (contact 
availability) while holding the educational composition constant.  
This specification can be seen as a way of estimating the impact of the assignment 
location invoking a minimum of assumptions. An alternative view is to interpret 
equation (2) as a reduced form of a structural model where school performance is 
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affected by cumulated peer influences between the time of immigration and the time of 
graduation (see Åslund and Fredriksson 2008 for further discussion).18 
4.3.1 Baseline results 
 
Table 2 presents the baseline results relating compulsory school GPA to neighborhood 
characteristics. The table only reports the results of main interest; the estimates on the 
other included characteristics are presented in Table A3. These additional covariates 
exhibit the expected impact. Girls outperform boys by about 8 percentile ranks on 
average. Parental education has a substantial impact on outcomes: a university educated 
mother increases the percentile rank by over 11 points relative to a mother with 
compulsory education (the estimates on father’s education have a similar flavor). There 
are substantial performance differences across birth regions and also patterns suggestive 
of worse outcomes in larger families, even though these patterns are weaker than what 
is sometimes found in descriptive studies (Åslund and Grönqvist 2009). 
Let us now turn to the estimates of the upper panel of Table 2, where school 
performance is related to the characteristics of the assigned neighborhood. Both the size 
and the educational attainment of the ethnic community have a positive impact on 
performance. There is no additional effect coming from the human capital of the 
parents. The latter result may be somewhat surprising. One interpretation is that highly 
educated adults in the ethnic community act as role-models.  
The magnitudes involved suggest that a given change in the educational attainment 
of the ethnic community is almost twice as important as the size of the community. 
                                                 
18 We do not estimate the structural model since, to identify it, we would have to assume that (i) the entire history of 
peer characteristics (since immigration) is equally important and (ii) that the characteristics of the assigned location 
are excludable from the outcome equation. Neither of these two assumptions is particularly attractive.  
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However, if the estimates are evaluated at the typical variation in the data they are about 
as important: one standard deviation changes in quality (education) and quantity (size of 
community) improves student performance by 0.9 percentile ranks. The effect of 
quantity is less precisely estimated (it is significant at the 10-percent level).19 
Since the human capital of the parents has no additional effect on student 
performance, we move on to the more parsimonious specification in column (2). The 
size of the coefficients is reduced somewhat but the level of human capital in the ethnic 
community remains statistically significant at the 10-percent level.  
The interaction between quantity and quality may also matter, i.e., it may be more (or 
less) important to have high quality peers in a sizable community. Column (3) adds the 
interaction of the two variables to the specification. The point estimate on the 
interaction is insignificant, and therefore we drop this specification from here on.  
The estimates in Panel A of Table 2 are not subject to bias due to residential sorting. 
To illustrate the importance of sorting bias, Panel B presents results from models where 
the characteristics of the ethnic community are measured at the time of graduation. The 
results show that sorting bias is a concern for the estimate on the size of the community: 
the estimate is statistically significant and has the opposite sign compared to the 
corresponding estimate in Panel A. Sorting bias does not appear to affect the estimate 
on the educational composition of the ethnic community. 
 
                                                 
19 An alternative evaluation point is the standard deviation calculated within ethnic groups across neighborhoods (see 
Table A.1). This evaluation point produces somewhat smaller effects but does not change the relative importance of 
quantity and quality. 
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Table 2 The relationship between neighborhood characteristics and compulsory school grades 
 
We noted in the previous section that the studied refugees became more concentrated 
with time in Sweden. The size of the ethnic community in the neighborhood doubles 
between the time of arrival and the time of graduation. The results in Table 2 imply that 
it is primarily less-skilled families (in the unobserved sense) that relocate to 
neighborhoods where ethnic concentration is higher. This pattern is similar to the 
findings of Edin et al (2003), who also concluded that sorting inflicts a negative bias on 
the estimate on the number of peer contacts. Note that we arrive at this conclusion 
despite having very flexible controls for neighborhoods and regions of origin. 
Dependent variable: Percentile ranked GPA  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Year of arrival 
Size of ethnic community 
 
.647* 
(.330) 
 
.488 
(.310) 
 
.409 
(.315) 
Share with high education 1.141** 
(.511) 
.987** 
(.498) 
1.120** 
(.508) 
Share of high-educated who are parents –.209 
(.668) 
-- -- 
Interaction (size and share high-educated) -- -- –.078 
(.059) 
    
Panel B. Year of graduation 
Size of ethnic community 
 
 
–.522** 
(.228) 
 
–.532** 
(.196) 
 
–.680** 
(.207) 
Share with high education 1.256** 
(.566) 
1.237** 
(.519) 
1.386** 
(.530) 
Share of high-educated who are parents .295 
(.533) 
-- -- 
Interaction (size and share high-educated) -- -- –.120* 
(.065) 
(Initial) SAMS FE:s Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group FE:s Yes Yes Yes 
Year of arrival FE:s Yes Yes Yes 
Year of graduation FE:s Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 20,039 20,039 20,039 
Notes:  Neighborhood characteristics are measured in logs. The sample consists of refugee immigrants whose par-
ents arrived during the period 1987−1991 and who completed compulsory school no later than 2003. Panel A displays 
estimates of neighborhood characteristics measured at the year of arrival. Panel B shows the corresponding esti-
mates for the year of graduation. All regressions control linearly for the subject’s and the mother’s age, with dummies 
for each parent’s educational attainment (five levels), family size, gender and missing values. Column (2) presents 
estimates where the coefficients are evaluated at the mean of the other variable. Standard errors robust for clustering 
at the SAMS*ethnic group level (5947 cells) in parentheses. ** = significant at 5 % level; * = significant at 10 % level 
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4.3.2 Analyses by subgroups 
 
We have re-estimated the baseline model of column (2) in Table 2 for some 
demographic subgroups; the results are presented in Table 3. First we examine if the 
effects vary by gender. According to the estimates, boys (who perform poorly in school) 
are significantly influenced by the number of peers, whereas girls are not.  
A similar pattern is available in columns (3) and (4), where the size of the 
community has a positive and significant for children from “non-academic” families 
(who perform less well in school). The effects of the human capital of the ethnic 
community do not vary by gender and educational background.  
The differential effects of the size of the peer group are interesting and shed some 
light on the sorting pattern in our data. Boys and children with a less-educated family 
background perform worse than average in school. The observed determinants of school 
outcomes are, arguably, positively associated with the unobserved factors determining 
school performance. The results presented in columns (1) to (4) thus suggest that it may 
be beneficial for students from weak backgrounds to sort themselves into ethnic 
communities, which is also the sorting pattern implied by the results in Table 2. 
In columns (5) and (6) the sample is split by age at migration. The assignment 
neighborhood characteristics are only important for children arriving before age seven. 
This could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be that skills are shaped at low 
ages (cf. Cunha and Heckman, 2007). And, second, the estimates could reflect a 
cumulative effect of peer contacts. Arriving at a young age arguably means longer 
exposure to the environment captured by the included variable, and thereby a higher 
treatment dose. 
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Table 3 Differential effects with respect to background characteristics. 
By gender By parental education By age at immigration  
 Boy 
 
 
(1) 
Girl 
 
 
(2) 
Academic 
family 
 
(3) 
Non-Aca-
demic 
family 
(4) 
Up until age 
seven 
 
(5) 
After age 
seven 
 
(6) 
Size of ethnic community  1.279**   
(.396) 
–.441 
(.450) 
–.121 
(.473) 
.946** 
(.454) 
1.284** 
(.449) 
–.543 
(.409) 
Share high educated  1.358**  
(.619) 
1.091 
(.697) 
1.521*   
(.892) 
1.169* 
(.690) 
1.903** 
(.731) 
–.514 
(.644) 
(Initial) SAMS FE:s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group FE:s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of arrival FE:s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of graduation FE:s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean (sd) of the dependent 
variable 
36.60    
(26.86) 
44.78    
(28.54) 
48.13    
(28.52) 
33.67    
(25.63) 
44.08    
(28.27) 
37.01    
(27.22) 
Number of observations 10,598 9,441 9,407 10,632 9,767 10,272 
Notes: Neighborhood characteristics are measured in logs. The sample consists of refugee immigrants whose parents 
arrived during 1987−1991 and who completed compulsory school no later than 2003. Where appropriate, the regres-
sions control linearly for the subject’s and the mother’s age, with dummies for each parent’s educational attainment (five 
levels), family size, gender and missing values. Standard errors robust for clustering at the SAMS*ethnic group level 
(5,947 cells) in parentheses. “Academic family” is defined as having at least one parent who has completed at least 
university preparatory upper-secondary school. ** = significant at 5 % level; * = significant at 10 % level. 
 
4.3.3 Robustness checks 
 
We have performed a number of robustness checks to investigate whether our results 
are sensitive to changes in sample composition, specification or outcome measure. In 
this section we discuss the results from these exercises.  
One concern is that neighborhood effects may be non-linear. For instance, the effect 
of living in an ethnic enclave might matter more for individuals residing in very highly 
segregated areas. To examine this we ran regressions including quadratic terms for our 
key variables of interest. It turns out that the estimates on the non-linear terms are not 
significantly different from zero.  
Another concern is that small source countries have been aggregated for 
confidentiality reasons in our data. Treating such regions as a single “country” 
obviously introduces measurement error in our analysis. We therefore re-estimated our 
models for individuals for whom we can uniquely identify country of origin. It turns out 
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that the coefficients are not statistically significantly different from our baseline 
estimates.  
We also experimented with alternative outcome variables. One relevant question is 
whether segregation influences host country language skills. We have therefore run 
regressions where the outcome is grade in Swedish.20 The results suggest that there is no 
impact of ethnic peers for Swedish grades: the estimate on the size of the community is 
–0.01 (with a standard error of 0.28) and the estimate on the share high educated is 0.52 
(with a standard error of 0.45). The weaker effects for this particular outcome can be 
interpreted in several ways. If it is the human capital of the ethnic peers that matters, it 
is reasonable that we estimate smaller effects where adults have less to contribute; 
another contributing factor is that there may be weaker incentives to learn the host 
country language in ethnic neighborhoods. 
Finally, we have investigated to what extent ethnic concentration affects the 
probability to finish school on schedule. In fact, 22 percent of our sample finish 9th 
grade later than “normal”. It turns out that these estimates are very imprecise. There is 
no evidence that peer characteristics influence the probability to graduate in time. 
5 Concluding remarks 
This paper studies peer effects in compulsory school performance among immigrant 
children in Sweden. To handle sorting in the residential market, the analysis uses a 
governmental refugee placement policy in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
                                                 
20 These estimates should be interpreted cautiously since immigrant students are allowed to choose between two 
different tracks: a standard track and a special track for immigrants. This introduces a potential selection problem; 
however, we find no evidence suggesting that the ethnic network affects the choice of track. 
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The results show that peers matter. The number of highly educated in the local ethnic 
community has a positive effect on compulsory school grades. Separating this effect 
into its components, we find that a higher level of education among fellow countrymen 
in the assigned neighborhood has a positive effect: A standard deviation increase in the 
fraction of highly educated peers raises student performance by 0.9 percentile ranks. A 
standard deviation increase in the size of the ethnic community has about the same 
effect, but the effect is less precisely estimated.  
Is this a small or large effect? At first glance, it may seem small relative to the 
importance of individual or family characteristics. For instance, it corresponds roughly 
to a tenth of the grade difference between refugee immigrants and the native-born in our 
data. But we think it would be a mistake to conclude that the characteristics of the 
neighborhood are largely irrelevant. Whether the magnitudes involved should be 
interpreted as small or large depends on the true structural model relating student 
performance to neighborhood or peer characteristics. Any human capital model would 
imply that the entire history of peer characteristics is relevant. In our setting, the 
majority of the families (some 75 percent) escaped “treatment” by moving out of the 
assigned neighborhoods. Under reasonable assumptions, this implies that our estimates 
on initial neighborhood characteristics are lower bounds on the true effects in the 
structural human capital model.  
We have also presented some evidence on the importance of handling the problems 
associated with residential sorting in studies relating contextual variables to individual 
outcomes. Like some previous studies on adult migrants (Edin et al. 2003, Åslund and 
Fredriksson 2008), we find that one is likely to infer—erroneously—that the number of 
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peer contacts has a negative effect on school performance if sorting bias is not 
addressed appropriately. In this respect, our analysis of heterogeneous effects reveals an 
interesting pattern. Disadvantaged students/families gain more by having many peers 
around than other students/families. And it is also these families that move to ethnically 
concentrated areas. The sorting pattern thus appears to be rational from the point of 
view of the disadvantaged groups. 
Our baseline estimates answer questions concerning the impact of varying the size 
and characteristics of one’s own ethnic group holding the other characteristics of the 
neighborhood constant. We also attempt to study the broader issue of immigrant 
segregation. Taken at face value, the results suggest that an immigrant-dense 
environment has a negative impact on student performance. While tentative, these 
results raise interesting questions. Establishing what lies behind these estimates is an 
important area for further study. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Subject:   
GPA (percentile rank) 40.45 27.96 
Age (in 2003)  21.95 3.84 
Age at immigration 8.00 3.8 
Female .47 .50 
Sibship size 2.99 1.56 
Mother:   
Age (in 2003) 47.38 6.39 
Education: Compulsory school  .50 .50 
Upper secondary school ≤ 2 years .14 .34 
Upper secondary school > 2 years .17 .38 
University ≤ 2 years .11 .31 
University > 2 years .08 .28 
Father:   
Age (in 2003)  51.48 6.99 
Education: Compulsory school  .42 .49 
Upper secondary school ≤ 2 years .14 .35 
Upper secondary school > 2 years, .17 .38 
University ≤ 2 years .12 .33 
University > 2 years .15 .35 
Regional characteristics: Year of arrival   
Share high-educated in own group  34%    
Share high-educated in immigrant group 31%    
“Ethnic” concentration 1.6%  
Immigrant concentration 19%  
Population size 1528  
ln(share high-educated in own group) –1.016 .758* 
[0.520] 
ln(size of ethnic community) 2.372 1.445* 
[1.100] 
ln(size of immigrant community) 4.830 1.217* 
[0.769] 
Regional characteristics: Year of graduation   
Share high-educated in own group  39%    
Share high-educated in immigrant group 38%    
“Ethnic” concentration 3.2%  
Immigrant concentration 31%  
Population size 2012  
Notes: The regional characteristics are defined with respect to the adult population aged 25-65. Summary statistics for 
each parent’s educational attainment is conditional on having found this information in the records. * The standard 
deviations are calculated excluding “empty cells”, i.e., excluding the observations where there is no other immigrant 
from the same source country in the neighborhood. The standard deviations within square brackets correspond to the 
standard deviation within ethnic group across neighborhoods. 
36
 
 
Table A2 Region of birth 
Region of birth Percent of sample 
1. Former Yugoslavia 5.2 
2. Poland 5.5 
3. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 0.3 
4. Eastern Europe 1  (Rumania, The former USSR, Bulgaria, Albania) 6.0 
5. Eastern Europe 2 (Hungary, The former Czechoslovakia) 2.4 
6. Mexico and Central America (El Salvador, Mexico    Other countries) 1.6 
7. Chile 13.3 
8. Other South America (Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Other countries) 2.0 
9. African Horn (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti) 5.0 
10. North Africa (Arabic countries) and Middle East (Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Algeria, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Other countries) 
17.8 
11. Other Africa (Gambia, Uganda, Zaire  Ghana, Other countries) 1.1 
12. Iran 25.5 
13. Iraq 4.8 
14. Turkey 3.8 
15. South East Asia (Vietnam, Thailand,  the Philippines,   Malaysia, Laos Other countries) 3.9 
16. Other Asia (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India,  Afghanistan, Pakistan) 1.7 
Total 100 
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Table A3 Estimates on individual characteristics for specification in Table 2, column (2) 
 Dependent variable: 
Percentile ranked GPA 
Individual characteristics:  
Female 8.137** 
(.371) 
Age at immigration –4.694** 
(.429) 
Mother characteristics:  
Age  .124** 
(.040) 
Education: Compulsory school  -- 
High school ≤ 2 years 4.716** 
(.800) 
High school > 2 years 5.886** 
(.732) 
University ≤ 2 years 11.339** 
(.897) 
University > 2 years 13.561** 
(1.039) 
Missing education .729 
(.939) 
Father characteristics:  
Missing father  1.237 
(1.057) 
Education: Compulsory school  -- 
High school ≤ 2 years 3.475** 
(.848) 
High school > 2 years 3.443** 
(.792) 
University ≤ 2 years 8.061** 
(.880) 
University > 2 years 11.697** 
(.905) 
Missing education –1.865** 
(.932) 
Family size FE:s Yes 
(Initial) Municipality FE:s Yes 
Ethnic group FE:s Yes 
Year of arrival FE:s Yes 
Year of graduation FE:s Yes 
Number of observations 20,039 
R-squared 0.335 
Notes: Estimates on individual characteristics for the specification in Table 1, column (1). The sample 
consists of refugee immigrants whose parents arrived during the period 1987−1991 and completed 
compulsory school not later than 2003. The regression also controls for the regional characteristics listed in 
Table 1, column (1) and indicator variables controlling for the SAMS*(ethnic group) “cell” having no 
observations. Standard errors are robust for clustering at the SAMS*ethnic group level (5947 cells) in 
parentheses. ** = significant at 5 % level; * = significant at 10 % level. 
 
 
 
38
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2007 
 
2007/1. Durán Cabré, J.Mª.; Esteller Moré, A.: "An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. tax 
compliance" 
2007/2. Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm 
location" 
2007/3. Duch, N.; Montolio, D.; Mediavilla, M.: "Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s 
performance: A quasi experimental approach" 
2007/4. Sánchez Hugalde, A.: "Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar" 
2007/5. Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Economic and political determinants of urban expansion: Exploring 
the local connection" 
2007/6. Segarra-Blasco, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel-Carrizosa, M.: "Barriers to innovation and public policy 
in Catalonia" 
2007/7. Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Evaluación de servicios educativos: El rendimiento en los centros públicos y 
privados medido en PISA-2003" 
2007/8. Argilés, J.M.; Duch Brown, N.: "A comparison of the economic and environmental performances of 
conventional and organic farming: Evidence from financial statement" 
 
2008 
 
2008/1. Castells, P.; Trillas, F.: "Political parties and the economy: Macro convergence, micro partisanship?" 
2008/2. Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of 
intergovernmental transfers?" 
2008/3. Schelker, M.; Eichenberger, R.: "Rethinking public auditing institutions: Empirical evidence from Swiss 
municipalities" 
2008/4. Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "Which communities should be afraid of mobility? The effects of 
agglomeration economies on the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes" 
2008/5. Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: "Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: do the 
experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?" 
2008/6. Solé-Ollé, A.; Hortas Rico, M.: "Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public 
services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities" 
2008/7. Sanromà, E.; Ramos, R.; Simón, H.: "Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. 
Evidencia para España" 
2008/8. Trillas, F.: "Regulatory federalism in network industries" 
 
2009 
 
2009/1. Rork, J.C.; Wagner, G.A.: "Reciprocity and competition: is there a connection?" 
2009/2. Mork, E.; Sjögren, A.; Svaleryd, H.: "Cheaper child care, more children" 
2009/3. Rodden, J.: "Federalism and inter-regional redistribution" 
2009/4. Ruggeri, G.C.: "Regional fiscal flows: measurement tools" 
2009/5. Wrede, M.: "Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization" 
2009/6. Jametti, M.; von Ungern-Sternberg, T.: "Risk selection in natural disaster insurance" 
2009/7. Solé-Ollé, A; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: does Spain 
behave differently?" 
2009/8. Sanromá, E.; Ramos, R.; Simón, H.: "Immigration wages in the Spanish Labour Market: Does the origin of 
human capital matter?" 
2009/9. Mohnen, P.; Lokshin, B.: "What does it take for and R&D incentive policy to be effective?" 
2009/10. Solé-Ollé, A.; Salinas, P..: "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain?" 
2009/11. Libman, A.; Feld, L.P.: "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The case of Russia" 
2009/12. Falck, O.; Fritsch, M.; Heblich, S.: "Bohemians, human capital, and regional economic growth" 
2009/13. Barrio-Castro, T.; García-Quevedo, J.: "The determinants of university patenting: do incentives matter?" 
2009/14. Schmidheiny, K.; Brülhart, M.: "On the equivalence of location choice models: conditional logit, nested 
logit and poisson" 
2009/15. Itaya, J., Okamuraz, M., Yamaguchix, C.: "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting" 
2009/16. Ens, P.: "Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal" 
2009/17. Geys, B., Revelli, F.: "Decentralization, competition and the local tax mix: evidence from Flanders" 
2009/18. Konrad, K., Kovenock, D.: "Competition for fdi with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages" 
2009/19. Loretz, S., Moorey, P.: "Corporate tax competition between firms" 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2009/20. Akai, N., Sato, M.: "Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership 
model with saving and free mobility" 
2009/21. Buzzacchi, L., Turati, G.: "Collective risks in local administrations: can a private insurer be better than a 
public mutual fund?" 
2009/22. Jarkko, H.: "Voluntary pension savings: the effects of the finnish tax reform on savers’ behaviour" 
2009/23. Fehr, H.; Kindermann, F.: "Pension funding and individual accounts in economies with life-cyclers and 
myopes" 
2009/24. Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "(Uncontrolled) Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidence 
from gasoline and cigarettes" 
2009/25. Goodspeed, T.; Haughwout, A.: "On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation" 
2009/26. Porto, E.; Revelli, F.: "Central command, local hazard and the race to the top" 
2009/27. Piolatto, A.: "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters’ representativeness" 
2009/28. Roeder, K.: "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents" 
2009/29, Porcelli, F.: "Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability on government efficiency 
evidence from the Italian health care sector" 
2009/30, Troumpounis, O.: "Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count" 
2009/31, Mejer, M., Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.: "Economic incongruities in the European patent system" 
2009/32, Solé-Ollé, A.: "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure  investment: tactical or programmatic?" 
2009/33, Joanis, M.: "Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California" 
2009/34, Parcero, O.J.: "Optimal country’s policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between 
firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies" 
2009/35, Cordero, J,M.; Pedraja, F.; Salinas, J.: "Efficiency measurement in the Spanish cadastral units through 
DEA" 
2009/36, Fiva, J.; Natvik, G.J.: "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?" 
2009/37, Haupt, A.; Krieger, T.: "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition" 
2009/38, Viladecans-Marsal, E; Arauzo-Carod, J.M.: "Can a knowledge-based cluster be created? The case of the 
Barcelona 22@district" 
 
2010 
 
2010/1, De Borger, B., Pauwels, W.: "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls 
and investment in serial transport corridors" 
2010/2, Chirinko, R.; Wilson, D.: "Can Lower Tax Rates Be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking And Tax Competition 
Among U.S. States" 
2010/3, Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "Politics or mobility? Evidence from us excise taxation" 
2010/4, Roehrs, S.; Stadelmann, D.: "Mobility and local income redistribution" 
2010/5, Fernández Llera, R.; García Valiñas, M.A.: "Efficiency and elusion: both sides of public enterprises in 
Spain" 
2010/6, González Alegre, J.: "Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental grants: the European regional policy 
and Spanish autonomous regions" 
2010/7, Jametti, M.; Joanis, M.: "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects" 
2010/8, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Should tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?" 
2010/9, Cubel, M.: "Fiscal equalization and political conflict" 
2010/10, Di Paolo, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Calero, J.: "Exploring educational mobility in Europe" 
2010/11, Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J.: "Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability" 
2010/12, Arqué Castells, P.: "Venture capital and innovation at the firm level" 
2010/13, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Polo-Otero, J.: "Which firms want PhDS? The effect of the 
university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market" 
2010/14, Calabrese, S.; Epple, D.: "On the political economy of tax limits" 
2010/15, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "Is agglomeration taxable?" 
2010/16, Dragu, T.; Rodden, J.: "Representation and regional redistribution in federations" 
2010/17, Borck, R; Wimbersky, M.: "Political economics of higher education finance" 
2010/18, Dohse, D; Walter, S.G.: "The role of entrepreneurship education and regional context in forming 
entrepreneurial intentions" 
 
Fiscal Federalism 
